TY - JOUR
T1 - What is moral about moral emotions? Guilt elicits prosocial behavior as well as antisocial behavior
AU - de Hooge, I.E.
AU - Nelissen, R.M.A.
AU - Breugelmans, S.M.
AU - Zeelenberg, M.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Moral emotions have been portrayed as the social mortar of
human societies because these feelings encourage us to put the
concerns of others above our own and to engage in prosocial
behavior. The hallmark moral emotion is guilt, which is typically
described as an “adaptive emotion, benefiting individuals and their
relationships in a variety of ways” (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,
2007, p. 26). However, is it really the case that moral emotions make
the interest of others paramount, neglecting our self-interest?
Guilt mostly arises from a moral transgression in which the
actor has violated an important norm and has hurt another person.
This elicits a preoccupation with the victim and the ensuing reparative
action tendencies are aimed at restoring the relationship between
transgressor and victim. This victim-oriented focus explains
the often-replicated finding that guilty people contribute more of
their endowments to others in comparison to non-guilty people. It
is clear that in dyadic situations guilt produces behavior that
benefits others.
However, we have reason to believe that the very characteristics
of guilt that make it beneficial to the victim in dyadic interactions
have disadvantageous side effects for others in the social
environment. In dyadic interactions the costs of acting prosocially
come necessarily at the expense of oneself. But in daily life it is also
possible to act prosocially at the cost of others. We think that the
generosity towards the victim has disadvantageous consequences
for the social environment. Precisely because guilt induces a
preoccupation with restoring the harm to the victim, it simultaneously
causes a neglect of others. Consequently, a guilty state may
not evoke a disregard for personal concerns (as is often assumed)
but rather a depreciation of the concerns of non-victimized others.
We predict that when taking such a broader, more ecologically valid
perspective, it will appear that people experiencing guilt are motivated
to benefit the relationship with the victim, but at the best
possible outcomes for themselves. Three experiments investigated
if the experience of guilt induces prosocial behavior towards the
victim at the expense of others rather than the self.
In Experiment 1, participants reported a personal experience
of feeling guilty (Guilt condition), or described a regular weekday
(Control condition). They were asked to think of the person they felt
guilty towards (guilt condition) or of a person they had met during
the weekday (control condition). This person was labeled Person A.
Participants then divided ¤50 between the birthday of Person A, the
fundraising of the victims of a flood, and themselves. We found that
Guilt participants offered more money to Person A than Control
participants. At the same time, guilt participants offered less money
to flood victims than Control participants. Guilt and Control participants
did not differ in the amount they kept for themselves.
Experiment 2 explored whether guilty people could also act
disadvantageously towards known others. Participants were randomly
assigned to the Guilt or Control condition and read a
scenario. Next, they divided ¤50 between the birthday of the victim
of the scenario, the birthday of another friend, and themselves.
Results showed that Guilt participants offered more money to the
victim than Control participants, and offered less money to the third
party. Participants did not differ in the amount they kept for
themselves. Thus, even when the social surrounding consists of
family and friends, the costs of compensatory behavior befall those
other people rather than oneself.
Experiment 3 tested our assumption that the preoccupation
with the victim that characterizes guilt causes disadvantageous side
effects for the social environment. This entails that no effects
should be found in situations where the victim is not present, which
was tested by adding a condition where the victim was not present.
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2
(Emotion condition: Guilt vs. Control) × 2 (Victim Presence:
Victim-present vs. Victim-not-present) design. They were told that
during the lab-session they could earn lottery tickets for a lottery.
The session started with two rounds of a performance task, ostensibly
with another participant. In the first round they could earn 8
lottery tickets for themselves, in the second round 8 tickets for the
other player. After the first round, all participants received feedback
that they earned the bonus. After the second round, the other player
in the Guilt condition did not receive the bonus due to the participant’s
bad performance. In the Control condition, the other player received
the bonus. Participants continued with a three persondictator
game, either with the player from the performance task
(Victim-present condition) or with a participant who knew nothing
about the performance task (Victim-not-present condition). In all
conditions the third player was a participant who knew nothing
about the letter task. As the dependent variable, the participant
divided twelve lottery tickets among the three players.
We found that participants in the Victim-present Guilt condition
offered significantly more to the victim than participants in the
Victim-present Control condition, and than participants in the
Victim-not-present Guilt condition. They also offered significantly
less to the third player than participants in the Victim-present
Control condition, and than participants in the Victim-not-present
Guilt condition. Higher offers to the victim did not come at personal
expense: all conditions did not differ in tickets kept for oneself.
In summary, it appears that guilt, the hallmark moral emotion,
can motivate behaviors that do not fit the predicate moral. When
people experience guilt, they are preoccupied with repairing the
harm done to the victim, leading to disadvantageous effects for
others in their social environment. This suggests that the view of
moral emotions as (unconditionally) beneficial for others should be
rephrased. Moral emotions do not make the interest of others in
general paramount, but rather motivate a selective focus on the
interests of the wronged other while not forgetting self-interest.
This indicates that a thorough understanding of functioning of
moral emotions is necessary to fully understand their influence on
consumer behavior.
AB - EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Moral emotions have been portrayed as the social mortar of
human societies because these feelings encourage us to put the
concerns of others above our own and to engage in prosocial
behavior. The hallmark moral emotion is guilt, which is typically
described as an “adaptive emotion, benefiting individuals and their
relationships in a variety of ways” (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,
2007, p. 26). However, is it really the case that moral emotions make
the interest of others paramount, neglecting our self-interest?
Guilt mostly arises from a moral transgression in which the
actor has violated an important norm and has hurt another person.
This elicits a preoccupation with the victim and the ensuing reparative
action tendencies are aimed at restoring the relationship between
transgressor and victim. This victim-oriented focus explains
the often-replicated finding that guilty people contribute more of
their endowments to others in comparison to non-guilty people. It
is clear that in dyadic situations guilt produces behavior that
benefits others.
However, we have reason to believe that the very characteristics
of guilt that make it beneficial to the victim in dyadic interactions
have disadvantageous side effects for others in the social
environment. In dyadic interactions the costs of acting prosocially
come necessarily at the expense of oneself. But in daily life it is also
possible to act prosocially at the cost of others. We think that the
generosity towards the victim has disadvantageous consequences
for the social environment. Precisely because guilt induces a
preoccupation with restoring the harm to the victim, it simultaneously
causes a neglect of others. Consequently, a guilty state may
not evoke a disregard for personal concerns (as is often assumed)
but rather a depreciation of the concerns of non-victimized others.
We predict that when taking such a broader, more ecologically valid
perspective, it will appear that people experiencing guilt are motivated
to benefit the relationship with the victim, but at the best
possible outcomes for themselves. Three experiments investigated
if the experience of guilt induces prosocial behavior towards the
victim at the expense of others rather than the self.
In Experiment 1, participants reported a personal experience
of feeling guilty (Guilt condition), or described a regular weekday
(Control condition). They were asked to think of the person they felt
guilty towards (guilt condition) or of a person they had met during
the weekday (control condition). This person was labeled Person A.
Participants then divided ¤50 between the birthday of Person A, the
fundraising of the victims of a flood, and themselves. We found that
Guilt participants offered more money to Person A than Control
participants. At the same time, guilt participants offered less money
to flood victims than Control participants. Guilt and Control participants
did not differ in the amount they kept for themselves.
Experiment 2 explored whether guilty people could also act
disadvantageously towards known others. Participants were randomly
assigned to the Guilt or Control condition and read a
scenario. Next, they divided ¤50 between the birthday of the victim
of the scenario, the birthday of another friend, and themselves.
Results showed that Guilt participants offered more money to the
victim than Control participants, and offered less money to the third
party. Participants did not differ in the amount they kept for
themselves. Thus, even when the social surrounding consists of
family and friends, the costs of compensatory behavior befall those
other people rather than oneself.
Experiment 3 tested our assumption that the preoccupation
with the victim that characterizes guilt causes disadvantageous side
effects for the social environment. This entails that no effects
should be found in situations where the victim is not present, which
was tested by adding a condition where the victim was not present.
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2
(Emotion condition: Guilt vs. Control) × 2 (Victim Presence:
Victim-present vs. Victim-not-present) design. They were told that
during the lab-session they could earn lottery tickets for a lottery.
The session started with two rounds of a performance task, ostensibly
with another participant. In the first round they could earn 8
lottery tickets for themselves, in the second round 8 tickets for the
other player. After the first round, all participants received feedback
that they earned the bonus. After the second round, the other player
in the Guilt condition did not receive the bonus due to the participant’s
bad performance. In the Control condition, the other player received
the bonus. Participants continued with a three persondictator
game, either with the player from the performance task
(Victim-present condition) or with a participant who knew nothing
about the performance task (Victim-not-present condition). In all
conditions the third player was a participant who knew nothing
about the letter task. As the dependent variable, the participant
divided twelve lottery tickets among the three players.
We found that participants in the Victim-present Guilt condition
offered significantly more to the victim than participants in the
Victim-present Control condition, and than participants in the
Victim-not-present Guilt condition. They also offered significantly
less to the third player than participants in the Victim-present
Control condition, and than participants in the Victim-not-present
Guilt condition. Higher offers to the victim did not come at personal
expense: all conditions did not differ in tickets kept for oneself.
In summary, it appears that guilt, the hallmark moral emotion,
can motivate behaviors that do not fit the predicate moral. When
people experience guilt, they are preoccupied with repairing the
harm done to the victim, leading to disadvantageous effects for
others in their social environment. This suggests that the view of
moral emotions as (unconditionally) beneficial for others should be
rephrased. Moral emotions do not make the interest of others in
general paramount, but rather motivate a selective focus on the
interests of the wronged other while not forgetting self-interest.
This indicates that a thorough understanding of functioning of
moral emotions is necessary to fully understand their influence on
consumer behavior.
M3 - Abstract
VL - 37
SP - 715
EP - 715
JO - Advances in Consumer Research
JF - Advances in Consumer Research
SN - 0098-9258
ER -