The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: Where we stand and ways to go

Achim Hagen, Pierre von Mouche, Hans Peter Weikard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.

Original languageEnglish
Article number3
JournalGames
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Mar 2020

Keywords

  • Binary action game
  • Cartel game
  • Coalition formation
  • Cournot-like game
  • Equilibrium coalition structure
  • Potential game
  • Symmetric game
  • Two-stage game

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