The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

R.B. Dellink, M. Finus, N.J. Olieman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)


Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)357-377
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2008


  • environmental agreements
  • damage costs
  • uncertainty
  • emissions
  • game


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