The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models

Kai Lessmann*, Ulrike Kornek, Valentina Bosetti, Rob Dellink, Johannes Emmerling, Johan Eyckmans, Miyuki Nagashima, Hans Peter Weikard, Zili Yang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore the stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. We identify robust results concerning the incentives of different nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement and estimate the extent of greenhouse gas mitigation that can be achieved by stable agreements. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation to foster the stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of appropriate transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)811-836
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume62
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2015

Keywords

  • Coalition stability
  • International environmental agreements
  • Numerical modeling
  • Transfers

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