The Hotelling bi-matrix game

P.H.M. van Mouche*, Willem Pijnappel

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We study the pure equilibrium set for a specific symmetric finite game in strategic form, referred to as the Hotelling bi-matrix game. General results tha guarantee non-emptiness of this set (for all parametric values) do not seem to exist. We prove non-emptiness by determining the pure equilibrium set. In this proof so-called demi-modality properties of the conditional payoff functions play an important role.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-202
JournalOptimization Letters
Volume12
Issue number1
Early online date2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2018

Keywords

  • bi-matrix game
  • demi-modality
  • hotelling
  • location theory
  • nash equilibrium
  • tarski fixed point theorem

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