The Continuous Hotelling Pure Location Game with Elastic Demand Revisited

Pierre von Mouche*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

The Hotelling pure location game has been revisited. It is assumed that there are two identical players, strategy sets are one-dimensional, and demand as a function of distance is constant or strictly decreasing. Besides qualitative properties of conditional payoff functions, attention is given to the structure of the equilibrium set, best-response correspondences and the existence of potentials.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research - 19th International Conference, MOTOR 2020, Proceedings
EditorsAlexander Kononov, Michael Khachay, Valery A. Kalyagin, Panos Pardalos
PublisherSpringer
Pages246-262
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9783030499877
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 29 Jun 2020
Event19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2020 - Novosibirsk, Russian Federation
Duration: 6 Jul 202010 Jul 2020

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume12095 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference19th International Conference on Mathematical Optimization Theory and Operations Research, MOTOR 2020
CountryRussian Federation
CityNovosibirsk
Period6/07/2010/07/20

Keywords

  • Hotelling game
  • Potential game
  • Principle of Minimum Differentiation
  • Pure Nash equilibrium existence

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