Abstract
We identify sufficient and necessary conditions for an aggregative game to have a unique Nash equilibrium. In particular, an improvement of a result of Gaudet and Salant (1991) for Cournot oligopolies is obtained. The results are obtained by exploiting the general between Nash equilibria and fixed points of the (virtual) aggregate cumulative best reply correspondence.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 353-364 |
| Journal | Journal of Nonlinear and Convex Analysis |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
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Keywords
- cournot equilibrium
Cite this
van Mouche, P. H. M., & Yamazaki, T. (2015). Sufficient and necessary conditions for equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games. Journal of Nonlinear and Convex Analysis, 16(2), 353-364.