Sufficient and necessary conditions for equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games

P.H.M. van Mouche, T. Yamazaki

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We identify sufficient and necessary conditions for an aggregative game to have a unique Nash equilibrium. In particular, an improvement of a result of Gaudet and Salant (1991) for Cournot oligopolies is obtained. The results are obtained by exploiting the general between Nash equilibria and fixed points of the (virtual) aggregate cumulative best reply correspondence.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)353-364
JournalJournal of Nonlinear and Convex Analysis
Volume16
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Keywords

  • cournot equilibrium

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