Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems

E.J.H. Ansink, H.P. Weikard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

58 Citations (Scopus)


We analyse the redistribution of a resource amongst agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise the class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, provide two characterisations of one specific rule, and compare sequential sharing rules with three alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-210
Number of pages25
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2012


  • international water law
  • game-theoretic analysis
  • allocation
  • bankruptcy
  • claims
  • compensation
  • rights
  • talmud


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