Reply to the comment by Thorsen et al. on "Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: An economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy"

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Abstract

In their comment Thorsen, Strange, and Helles (this journal) suggest that the model we use in our paper "Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: an economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy." Forest Policy and Economics 6, 567-578 includes a misspecification of subsidy payments under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92. They further claim that a correct specification of the subsidy payments would neither change the optimal forest rotation rate nor result in welfare changes. Indeed, the comment is important, because if the subsidies under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92 would not have an impact on the private optimal rotation rate there would be no welfare changes due to the payment of subsidies. The authors further argue that even if our model were correct, it would not allow conclusions to be derived on potential welfare changes. We argue that neither of the two positions are correct
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)109-112
JournalForest Policy and Economics
Volume9
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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subsidies
economic analysis
carbon sequestration
subsidy
incentive
Italy
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welfare
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forest economics
regulation
forest policy
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Afforestation
Incentives
Subsidies
Economic analysis
Carbon sequestration

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@article{f9396297ad4d4877869f3a2a7b777273,
title = "Reply to the comment by Thorsen et al. on {"}Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: An economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy{"}",
abstract = "In their comment Thorsen, Strange, and Helles (this journal) suggest that the model we use in our paper {"}Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: an economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy.{"} Forest Policy and Economics 6, 567-578 includes a misspecification of subsidy payments under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92. They further claim that a correct specification of the subsidy payments would neither change the optimal forest rotation rate nor result in welfare changes. Indeed, the comment is important, because if the subsidies under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92 would not have an impact on the private optimal rotation rate there would be no welfare changes due to the payment of subsidies. The authors further argue that even if our model were correct, it would not allow conclusions to be derived on potential welfare changes. We argue that neither of the two positions are correct",
author = "V.C. Tassone and J.H.H. Wesseler and F.S. Nesci",
year = "2006",
doi = "10.1016/j.forpol.2005.05.001",
language = "English",
volume = "9",
pages = "109--112",
journal = "Forest Policy and Economics",
issn = "1389-9341",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reply to the comment by Thorsen et al. on "Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: An economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy"

AU - Tassone, V.C.

AU - Wesseler, J.H.H.

AU - Nesci, F.S.

PY - 2006

Y1 - 2006

N2 - In their comment Thorsen, Strange, and Helles (this journal) suggest that the model we use in our paper "Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: an economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy." Forest Policy and Economics 6, 567-578 includes a misspecification of subsidy payments under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92. They further claim that a correct specification of the subsidy payments would neither change the optimal forest rotation rate nor result in welfare changes. Indeed, the comment is important, because if the subsidies under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92 would not have an impact on the private optimal rotation rate there would be no welfare changes due to the payment of subsidies. The authors further argue that even if our model were correct, it would not allow conclusions to be derived on potential welfare changes. We argue that neither of the two positions are correct

AB - In their comment Thorsen, Strange, and Helles (this journal) suggest that the model we use in our paper "Diverging incentives for afforestation from carbon sequestration: an economic analysis of the EU afforestation program in the south of Italy." Forest Policy and Economics 6, 567-578 includes a misspecification of subsidy payments under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92. They further claim that a correct specification of the subsidy payments would neither change the optimal forest rotation rate nor result in welfare changes. Indeed, the comment is important, because if the subsidies under Regulation (EEC) 2080/92 would not have an impact on the private optimal rotation rate there would be no welfare changes due to the payment of subsidies. The authors further argue that even if our model were correct, it would not allow conclusions to be derived on potential welfare changes. We argue that neither of the two positions are correct

U2 - 10.1016/j.forpol.2005.05.001

DO - 10.1016/j.forpol.2005.05.001

M3 - Editorial

VL - 9

SP - 109

EP - 112

JO - Forest Policy and Economics

JF - Forest Policy and Economics

SN - 1389-9341

IS - 2

ER -