Realism without Speculation: Heidegger, Meillassoux and the Question of Philosophical Method

Vincent Blok*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this article, we evaluate Meillassoux’s criticism of correlationism in general and of Heidegger’s correlationism in particular. Contrary to earlier contributions, we argue that Meillassoux’s reflections on uncorrelated being not only serve an epistemological but also an ontological interest; both Meillassoux and Heidegger are interested in the way we have access to uncorrelated being as well as in the nature of uncorrelated being itself. After introducing Meillassoux’s criticism of the correlationism of Heidegger, we reflect on three arguments of his account of planet earth as un-correlated being; the emergence of planet earth, the presupposed accessibility of un-correlated being and his criticism of Heidegger’s fideism. Although it becomes clear that Meillassoux’s criticism of correlationism is not applicable in the case of Heidegger, it also helps us to articulate the relevance of Heidegger’s “realist” approach of uncorrelated being in contemporary philosophy.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)381-404
JournalStudia Phaenomenologica
Volume17
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

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