Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data analysis

J.G. Klomp, J. de Haan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)


We test the hypothesis that governments facing popular protest are more likely to use fiscal policy for re-election purposes, employing data of 65 democratic countries–both developed and developing–over the period 1975–2005. Using the number of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes in pre-election years as measures of popular protest, our results lend support to this hypothesis. The effect of protest on the manipulation of fiscal policy for re-election purposes is strongest in young democracies.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)516-520
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2013


  • business-cycle
  • models
  • determinants
  • democracies
  • countries
  • debt


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