Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Kutay Cingiz, János Flesch, P. Jean-Jacques*, Arkadi Predtetchinski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games have no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for any ϵ sufficiently small. Furthermore, we present a number of sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)965-985
JournalEconomic Theory
Publication statusPublished - 28 May 2019


  • Infinitely many players
  • Minority games
  • Subgame perfect ϵ-equilibria
  • Upper semicontinuous functions

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