On Uniqueness of coalitional equilibria

M. Finus, P.H.M. van Mouche, B. Rundshagen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

For the so-called "new approach" of coalitio formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existene and to semi-uniqueness, i.e.\that there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide smi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrum semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional strategy sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Game Theory and Management volume 7 - Collected papers presented on the Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management /
EditorsL.A. Petrosyan, N.A. Zenkevich
Pages51-60
Number of pages438
Publication statusPublished - 2014

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