On games with constant Nash sum

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference paperAcademicpeer-review


A class of games in strategic form with the following property is identified: for every n ¿ E, i.e. Nash equilibrium, the (Nash) sum is constant. For such a game sufficient conditions for E to be polyhedral and semi-uniqueness (i.e. #E = 1) are given. The abstract results are illustrated by applying them to a class of games that covers various types of Cournot oligopoly and transboundary pollution games. The way of obtaining the results is by analysing so-called left and right marginal reductions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationContributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol IV, St. Petersburg, Russia, 28 - 30 June, 2011
EditorsL.A. Petrosyan, N.A. Zenkevich
Place of PublicationSt. Petersburg, Russia
PublisherGraduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University
ISBN (Print)9785992400694
Publication statusPublished - 2011
EventThe Fourth Conference Game Theory and Management, St. petersburg, Russia -
Duration: 28 Jun 201030 Jun 2010


ConferenceThe Fourth Conference Game Theory and Management, St. petersburg, Russia

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'On games with constant Nash sum'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this