A class of games in strategic form with the following property is identified: for every n ¿ E, i.e. Nash equilibrium, the (Nash) sum is constant. For such a game sufficient conditions for E to be polyhedral and semi-uniqueness (i.e. #E = 1) are given. The abstract results are illustrated by applying them to a class of games that covers various types of Cournot oligopoly and transboundary pollution games. The way of obtaining the results is by analysing so-called left and right marginal reductions.
|Title of host publication||Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol IV, St. Petersburg, Russia, 28 - 30 June, 2011|
|Editors||L.A. Petrosyan, N.A. Zenkevich|
|Place of Publication||St. Petersburg, Russia|
|Publisher||Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University|
|Publication status||Published - 2011|
|Event||The Fourth Conference Game Theory and Management, St. petersburg, Russia - |
Duration: 28 Jun 2010 → 30 Jun 2010
|Conference||The Fourth Conference Game Theory and Management, St. petersburg, Russia|
|Period||28/06/10 → 30/06/10|
van Mouche, P. H. M. (2011). On games with constant Nash sum. In L. A. Petrosyan, & N. A. Zenkevich (Eds.), Contributions to Game Theory and Management, Vol IV, St. Petersburg, Russia, 28 - 30 June, 2011 (pp. 294-310). St. Petersburg, Russia: Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg University.