Nash Equilibria of Transboundary Pollution Games

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Abstract

We reconsider the Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness problem for transboundary pollution games. There is special attention for the equilibrium set E for effective compact transboundary pollution games with continuous strictly concave production functions, continuous convex damage cost functions and uniformly distributed transboundary pollution. For this case we show that E is a non-empty polytope and that for each country all equilibrium deposition levels are equal. If in addition each damage cost function is differentiable, then there is a unique equilibrium. The results are obtained by exploiting the aggregative structure of transboundary pollution games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationHandbook of Research methods and Applications in Environmental Studies
EditorsMatthias Ruth
Place of PublicationCheltenham, UK
PublisherEdward Elgar
Pages504-524
ISBN (Print)9781783474639
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Publication series

NameHandbooks of Research Methods and Applications series
PublisherEdward Elgar

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