@inbook{bb36623be87d413198ec7e52b61f3eb7,
title = "Nash Equilibria of Transboundary Pollution Games",
abstract = "We reconsider the Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness problem for transboundary pollution games. There is special attention for the equilibrium set E for effective compact transboundary pollution games with continuous strictly concave production functions, continuous convex damage cost functions and uniformly distributed transboundary pollution. For this case we show that E is a non-empty polytope and that for each country all equilibrium deposition levels are equal. If in addition each damage cost function is differentiable, then there is a unique equilibrium. The results are obtained by exploiting the aggregative structure of transboundary pollution games. ",
author = "H. Folmer and {van Mouche}, P.H.M.",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.4337/9781783474646.00029",
language = "English",
isbn = "9781783474639 ",
series = "Handbooks of Research Methods and Applications series",
publisher = "Edward Elgar",
pages = "504--524",
editor = "Matthias Ruth",
booktitle = "Handbook of Research methods and Applications in Environmental Studies",
address = "United Kingdom",
}