Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries

H.P. Weikard, L. Wangler, A. Freytag

Research output: Book/ReportReportAcademic

Abstract

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationJena, Germany
PublisherFriedrich Schiller University
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Publication series

NameJena Economic Research Papers
PublisherFriedrich Schiller University
No.2009-077

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this