Methods for computing Nash equilibria of a location-quantity game

M.E. Sáiz Pérez, E.M.T. Hendrix

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)


A two-stage model is described where firms take decisions on where to locate their facility and on how much to supply to which market. In such models in literature, typically the market price reacts linearly on supply. Often two competing suppliers are assumed or several that are homogeneous, i.e., their cost structure is assumed to be identical. The focus of this paper is on developing methods to compute equilibria of the model where more than two suppliers are competing that each have their own cost structure, i.e., they are heterogeneous. Analytical results are presented with respect to optimality conditions for the Nash equilibria in the two stages. Based on these analytical results, an enumeration algorithm and a local search algorithm are developed to find equilibria. Numerical cases are used to illustrate the results and the viability of the algorithms. The methods find an improvement of a result reported in literature.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3311-3330
JournalComputers and Operations Research
Issue number10
Publication statusPublished - 2008


  • spatially separated markets
  • competitive location
  • oligopoly

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Methods for computing Nash equilibria of a location-quantity game'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this