Abstract
Does enforcement action by the Netherlands Competition Authority
(NMa) in the case of cartels and mergers produce an anticipatory effect? We use
surveys among firms and their advisers to test whether merger plans that may fail to
gain clearance from the NMa are not notified and whether the possibility of detection
helps to reduce the number of cartels. Our results indicate that enforcement action by
the NMa has a preventive effect. Surveys among companies show that 5% of the notified
mergers were modified before notification to forestall possible objections from
the NMa. Moreover, for every 100 notifications of mergers there are 13 proposed
mergers that are later on abandoned due to merger control. Companies also take account
of the Competition Act when drafting contracts, conducting negotiations and
holding meetings. Our survey among lawyers and other advisers shows that for every sanction decision taken by the NMa there are almost 5 cases in which, unbeknown to
the NMa, a prohibited act has been terminated or modified in response to advice on
competition law.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 357-376 |
Journal | De Economist - Quarterly Review of The Royal Netherlands Economic Association |
Volume | 160 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2012 |
Keywords
- antitrust enforcement
- competition policy
- deterrence