International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

Kim Hang Pham Do; H. Folmer

International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

Kim Hang Pham Do, H. Folmer

Urban Economics

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic

Abstract

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	The Theory and Practice of Environmental and Resource Economics
Editors	T. Aronsson, R. Axelsson, R. Brännlund
Place of Publication	Cheltenham
Publisher	Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Pages	146-172
Number of pages	27
ISBN (Print)	9781845426491
Publication status	Published - 2006

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Pham Do, K. H., & Folmer, H. (2006). International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. In T. Aronsson, R. Axelsson, & R. Brännlund (Eds.), The Theory and Practice of Environmental and Resource Economics (pp. 146-172). Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/international-fisheries-agreements(1b8f7ba5-c854-48f4-8ec0-9ebc4fea8b28).html

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abstract = "This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.",

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Pham Do, KH & Folmer, H 2006, International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. in T Aronsson, R Axelsson & R Brännlund (eds), The Theory and Practice of Environmental and Resource Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, pp. 146-172. <https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/international-fisheries-agreements(1b8f7ba5-c854-48f4-8ec0-9ebc4fea8b28).html>

International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation. / Pham Do, Kim Hang; Folmer, H.

The Theory and Practice of Environmental and Resource Economics. ed. / T. Aronsson; R. Axelsson; R. Brännlund. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006. p. 146-172.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Academic

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