International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

Kim Hang Pham Do, H. Folmer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterAcademic

Abstract

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Theory and Practice of Environmental and Resource Economics
EditorsT. Aronsson, R. Axelsson, R. Brännlund
Place of PublicationCheltenham
PublisherEdward Elgar Publishing Limited
Pages146-172
Number of pages27
ISBN (Print)9781845426491
Publication statusPublished - 2006

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