International environmental agreements with support

Erik Ansink*, Hans Peter Weikard, Cees Withagen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-252
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Early online date24 Feb 2018
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019


  • Coalition formation
  • International environmental agreements
  • Public goods
  • Support
  • Transfers


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