International environmental agreements with support

Erik Ansink*, Hans Peter Weikard, Cees Withagen

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)241-252
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume97
Early online date24 Feb 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2019

Fingerprint

greenhouse gas
cost
International environmental agreements
Abatement
Coalition formation
Greenhouse gas emissions
Costs and benefits
Cartel
Free riders

Keywords

  • Coalition formation
  • International environmental agreements
  • Public goods
  • Support
  • Transfers

Cite this

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International environmental agreements with support. / Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans Peter; Withagen, Cees.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 97, 09.2019, p. 241-252.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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T1 - International environmental agreements with support

AU - Ansink, Erik

AU - Weikard, Hans Peter

AU - Withagen, Cees

PY - 2019/9

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AB - We augment the standard cartel formation game from non-cooperative coalition theory, often applied in the context of international environmental agreements, with the possibility that singletons support coalition formation without becoming coalition members themselves. We assume their support takes the form of a monetary transfer to the coalition, in order to induce larger coalitions, higher levels of public good provision and higher payoffs. We show that, under mild conditions on the costs and benefits of contributing to the public good (e.g. abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), there exist equilibria with support. Allowing for support increases payoffs to each of three types of agents: members, supporters and free-riders.

KW - Coalition formation

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KW - Public goods

KW - Support

KW - Transfers

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DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.02.001

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