International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter

Irene Alvarado-Quesada, Hans Peter Weikard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-49
JournalSpatial Economic Analysis
Volume12
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017

Keywords

  • biodiversity conservation
  • coalition formation
  • international environmental agreements
  • spatial structure of cooperation

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