Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems

P.H.M. van Mouche, H. Folmer, S. Ragland

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

The purpose of this paper to introduce the concept of interconnected games and to show its relevance for modeling international environmental problems. It is argued that an interconnected game approach to international environmental problems may enhance cooperation and provide an alternative to the use of financial side payments to induce countries to cooperate. Two types of interconnected games are distinguished in this paper, i.e. direct sum games and tensor games. In the former all the constituting isolated games are games in a strategic form and in the latter they are repeated games. In both cases the interconnected game can be interpreted as a multiple objective game, but only the setting where a trade-off is made for the vector-payoffs is considered. In additin to the formal definition of these types of interconnected games, some elemenary results concerning Nash equilibria of such games are derived.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationGame theory and International Environmental Cooperation
Subtitle of host publicationEssential Readings
EditorsM. Finus, A. Caparros
Place of PublicationCheltenham, U.K.
PublisherEdgar Elgar Publishing
Pages215-237
ISBN (Print)9781782545095
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Publication series

NameThe International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series

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