Individualization Without Internalization

Ludger van Dijk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

What is that “inner” voice that keeps you up at night or that tells you to stop as you reach for another chocolate? Advances in embodied cognitive science raise doubts about explaining the “self” as the result of internalizing our shared world. On that emerging view, there is nothing to transport from outside to inside the skull. But, if not an inner state of mind, then how should we understand the experience of a self? This paper develops a relational approach to individualization by aligning ecological thinking with practice theory through Meadian considerations. On this account, we continuously experience a meaningful world, filled with possibilities for action, tied to things in places and practices. Practices are intergenerational processes in which materials get organized by what we do, while in turn organizing us. Becoming a “self” requires learning to attend to such communal organizations as one's relation to the world expands across development. As we learn to engage various such organizations skillfully, we can experience them responding to us. Situated across practices, the “self” develops as a reciprocal relation between multiple timescales: notably between communal practices and a person's skilled activities. When we close our eyes and our thoughts come to the fore, we experience this reciprocal relation directly. To get this relational self into view, psychology needs to get out of our heads and study the worldly conditions that make us.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere70132
JournalCognitive Science
Volume49
Issue number10
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2025

Keywords

  • Affordances
  • Ecological psychology
  • Mead
  • Others
  • Practices
  • Self
  • Skill

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