In view of the declining groundwater table in the North China Plain, this article explores whether, under current farmer groups' irrigation rules and their enforcement, control on irrigation water use can be high. This article first explores whether the sample's rule designs enable potentially excessive irrigation water use to be monitored and sanctioned. It then examines whether this potential to monitor and sanction is exploited under the given stakeholder constellation. The results of the study show that excessive water use and delays in irrigation handover could only be monitored and sanctioned in one case. In many cases, the rule design leads to a low potential to back monitoring with sanctioning, which is why monitoring becomes less effective. Furthermore, in these cases, the stakeholder constellation and group size have a major effect on the effort required to monitor excessive water use.
- common-pool resources
- collective action
Bluemling, B., Pahl-Wostl, C., Yang, H., & Mosler, H. J. (2010). Implications of Stakeholder Constellations for the Implementation of Irrigation Rules at Jointly Used Wells - Cases from the North China Plain, China. Society & Natural Resources, 23(6), 557-572. https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920903376998