Abstract
This paper provides a formal analysis of the evolution of cooperation in the management of common property resources. We develop a dynamic model that includes moral norms or a sense of 'identity,' and show that cooperation may – but need not – be an equilibrium outcome in the absence of intervention by a managing agency or punishment by peers. We demonstrate that outside intervention has ambiguous effects when identity matters – it may reduce welfare of the agents harvesting the stock.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Article number | 13 |
| Journal | The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2010 |
Keywords
- property resource use
- reduction methods
- moral motivation
- free access
- cooperation
- systems
- evolution
- economics
- privatization
- management