Homo Ludicus: Expected Strategies and Jurisprudence

Alessio Sardo*, F. Esposito

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Joint intentionality is a concept en vogue in general jurisprudence.
Richard Ekins has relied on joint intentionality to account for how legislatures can have intentions. At a more foundational level, Scott Shapiro has relied on shared intentions for explaining the normativity of legality. In this essay, we propose a metaphysically parsimonious approach called “expected-strategies approach”, combined with a team-reasoning approach to legislation. Based on a game-theoretic perspective, this approach anchors normativity to our capacity of coordinating our actions, both at the level of the law-maker, and at the level of the legal subjects. We show that for this coordinating function, an understanding of other players’ expected strategies is sufficient. The expected-strategies approach portrays the rational agent as a homo ludicus, whose key social virtues are stability and predictability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)95-122
JournalTeoria e Critica della Regolazione Sociale
Volume2
Issue number19
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Externally publishedYes

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