Explaining the uneven distribution of conflict-mineral policy implementation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: The role of the Katanga policy network (2009–2011)

There exists a widespread assumption that many of the belligerent parties in eastern DRC finance part of their war efforts through the sale of mineral ores originating from the areas under their control. As a result, recent years have witnessed the launch of various national and international initiatives to make the Congolese artisanal mining sector more transparent and to prevent so-called 'conflict minerals' from entering the legitimate international market. A strikingly paradoxical feature of these initiatives is that, in terms of the level of implementation, the conflict-ridden Kivu provinces are lagging far behind the relatively stable province of Katanga. This paper argues that the concentration of conflict mineral policy implementation in Katanga can, to a very large extent, be attributed to the role of the 'Katanga policy network', a group of highly influential public and private actors closely working together towards the reform of the province's artisanal and small-scale mining sector. In line with the dialectical approach to policy networks advocated by Marsh and Smith, the paper examines three types of interactive relationships: between the structure of the Katangese policy network and the agents operating within them; between the Katangese policy network and the context in which it operates; and between the Katangese policy network and the policy outcome.