Estimating the per-contact probability of infection by highly pathogenic avian influenza (H7N7) virus during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands.

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Abstract

Estimates of the per-contact probability of transmission between farms of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus of H7N7 subtype during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands are important for the design of better control and biosecurity strategies. We used standardized data collected during the epidemic and a model to extract data for untraced contacts based on the daily number of infectious farms within a given distance of a susceptible farm. With these data, we used a maximum likelihood estimation approach to estimate the transmission probabilities by the individual contact types, both traced and untraced. The estimated conditional probabilities, conditional on the contact originating from an infectious farm, of virus transmission were: 0.000057 per infectious farm within 1 km per day, 0.000413 per infectious farm between 1 and 3 km per day, 0.0000895 per infectious farm between 3 and 10 km per day, 0.0011 per crisis organisation contact, 0.0414 per feed delivery contact, 0.308 per egg transport contact, 0.133 per other-professional contact and, 0.246 per rendering contact. We validate these outcomes against literature data on virus genetic sequences for outbreak farms. These estimates can be used to inform further studies on the role that improved biosecurity between contacts and/or contact frequency reduction can play in eliminating between-farm spread of the virus during future epidemics. The findings also highlight the need to; 1) understand the routes underlying the infections without traced contacts and, 2) to review whether the contact-tracing protocol is exhaustive in relation to all the farm’s day-to-day activities and practices.
LanguageEnglish
Article numbere40929
Number of pages1
JournalPLoS ONE
Volume7
Issue number7
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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H7N7 Subtype Influenza A Virus
Influenza in Birds
avian influenza
Orthomyxoviridae
Viruses
Influenza A virus
Netherlands
Farms
farms
Infection
infection
biosecurity
Contact Tracing
viruses
Maximum likelihood estimation
virus transmission
rendering

Keywords

  • h5n1 infection
  • poultry farms
  • a virus
  • transmission
  • outbreaks
  • history

Cite this

@article{2c632f617322464eb93745424ef85e4f,
title = "Estimating the per-contact probability of infection by highly pathogenic avian influenza (H7N7) virus during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands.",
abstract = "Estimates of the per-contact probability of transmission between farms of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus of H7N7 subtype during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands are important for the design of better control and biosecurity strategies. We used standardized data collected during the epidemic and a model to extract data for untraced contacts based on the daily number of infectious farms within a given distance of a susceptible farm. With these data, we used a maximum likelihood estimation approach to estimate the transmission probabilities by the individual contact types, both traced and untraced. The estimated conditional probabilities, conditional on the contact originating from an infectious farm, of virus transmission were: 0.000057 per infectious farm within 1 km per day, 0.000413 per infectious farm between 1 and 3 km per day, 0.0000895 per infectious farm between 3 and 10 km per day, 0.0011 per crisis organisation contact, 0.0414 per feed delivery contact, 0.308 per egg transport contact, 0.133 per other-professional contact and, 0.246 per rendering contact. We validate these outcomes against literature data on virus genetic sequences for outbreak farms. These estimates can be used to inform further studies on the role that improved biosecurity between contacts and/or contact frequency reduction can play in eliminating between-farm spread of the virus during future epidemics. The findings also highlight the need to; 1) understand the routes underlying the infections without traced contacts and, 2) to review whether the contact-tracing protocol is exhaustive in relation to all the farm’s day-to-day activities and practices.",
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author = "A. Ssematimba and A.R.W. Elbers and T.H.J. Hagenaars and {de Jong}, M.C.M.",
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AU - Ssematimba, A.

AU - Elbers, A.R.W.

AU - Hagenaars, T.H.J.

AU - de Jong, M.C.M.

PY - 2012

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N2 - Estimates of the per-contact probability of transmission between farms of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza virus of H7N7 subtype during the 2003 epidemic in the Netherlands are important for the design of better control and biosecurity strategies. We used standardized data collected during the epidemic and a model to extract data for untraced contacts based on the daily number of infectious farms within a given distance of a susceptible farm. With these data, we used a maximum likelihood estimation approach to estimate the transmission probabilities by the individual contact types, both traced and untraced. The estimated conditional probabilities, conditional on the contact originating from an infectious farm, of virus transmission were: 0.000057 per infectious farm within 1 km per day, 0.000413 per infectious farm between 1 and 3 km per day, 0.0000895 per infectious farm between 3 and 10 km per day, 0.0011 per crisis organisation contact, 0.0414 per feed delivery contact, 0.308 per egg transport contact, 0.133 per other-professional contact and, 0.246 per rendering contact. We validate these outcomes against literature data on virus genetic sequences for outbreak farms. These estimates can be used to inform further studies on the role that improved biosecurity between contacts and/or contact frequency reduction can play in eliminating between-farm spread of the virus during future epidemics. The findings also highlight the need to; 1) understand the routes underlying the infections without traced contacts and, 2) to review whether the contact-tracing protocol is exhaustive in relation to all the farm’s day-to-day activities and practices.

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