Election or Disaster Support?

Jeroen Klomp*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

In this study, I explore whether the public spending provided in response to a natural disaster is affected by upcoming elections. The theory on retrospective voting argues that politicians are kept responsible by the electorate for the damage caused by a natural catastrophe. At the same time, voters reward government officials when they react promptly by taking actions that limit the negative consequences. Thus, disaster support in the aftermath might not always only be provided to improve the economic situation after a disaster, but also for political purposes. My estimates seem to confirm this idea since roughly 10 per cent of the disaster related public spending provided in an election year is attributed to rent seeking rather than need. It turns out that the existence of these election cycles can partly be explained by cross-country differences. For instance, elections have a stronger effect in countries that are characterised by fewer checks and balances, presidential system and majority elections. One interesting result is that the role of media in electoral manipulation changes when a disaster has happened in the year before.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)205-220
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Development Studies
Volume56
Issue number1
Early online date19 Mar 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jan 2020

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election
disaster
public spending
majority election
presidential system
economic situation
rent seeking
rent
manipulation
reward
voting
politician
natural disaster
damages
damage

Cite this

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title = "Election or Disaster Support?",
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Election or Disaster Support? / Klomp, Jeroen.

In: Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1, 01.2020, p. 205-220.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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