TY - JOUR
T1 - Do Elections Cause Military Spending to Go Up or Down? New International Evidence
AU - Klomp, Jeroen
AU - de Haan, Jakob
PY - 2024/5/2
Y1 - 2024/5/2
N2 - This study explores whether the level of military expenditures is affected by the occurrence of elections. From a theoretical perspective, it is not immediately clear whether, and if so, in which direction, upcoming elections shift military expenditures. On the one hand, the incumbent may try to enhance the likelihood of being re-elected by supporting the domestic defense industry. On the other hand, it might be more attractive to cut defense spending and increase non-defense spending. It is also possible that both effects coexist. We therefore apply the finite mixture model (FMM), which is able to test competing hypotheses. Our results, based on a panel of 93 democratic countries between 1980 and 2018 and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data on military spending, yield support for both hypotheses. Countries facing security risks or having a significant defense industry are most likely to expand their defense spending in an election year, while other countries are more likely to reduce their defense expenditure.
AB - This study explores whether the level of military expenditures is affected by the occurrence of elections. From a theoretical perspective, it is not immediately clear whether, and if so, in which direction, upcoming elections shift military expenditures. On the one hand, the incumbent may try to enhance the likelihood of being re-elected by supporting the domestic defense industry. On the other hand, it might be more attractive to cut defense spending and increase non-defense spending. It is also possible that both effects coexist. We therefore apply the finite mixture model (FMM), which is able to test competing hypotheses. Our results, based on a panel of 93 democratic countries between 1980 and 2018 and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data on military spending, yield support for both hypotheses. Countries facing security risks or having a significant defense industry are most likely to expand their defense spending in an election year, while other countries are more likely to reduce their defense expenditure.
KW - finite mixture models
KW - military spending
KW - non-military government spending
KW - political budget cycles
UR - https://doi.org/10.25384/SAGE.25746115
U2 - 10.1177/0095327X241247063
DO - 10.1177/0095327X241247063
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85192158243
SN - 0095-327X
JO - Armed Forces and Society
JF - Armed Forces and Society
ER -