Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors?

J.G. Klomp, J. de Haan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we confirm the hypothesis that central bank independence reforms reduce the likelihood that a central bank governor will be replaced. However, the strength of this effect depends on the rule of law and the degree of political polarization. (c) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)219-222
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume106
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Keywords

  • institutions
  • models

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