Debunking (the) Retribution (Gap)

Steven R. Kraaijeveld*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Robotization is an increasingly pervasive feature of our lives. Robots with high degrees of autonomy may cause harm, yet in sufficiently complex systems neither the robots nor the human developers may be candidates for moral blame. John Danaher has recently argued that this may lead to a retribution gap, where the human desire for retribution faces a lack of appropriate subjects for retributive blame. The potential social and moral implications of a retribution gap are considerable. I argue that the retributive intuitions that feed into retribution gaps are best understood as deontological intuitions. I apply a debunking argument for deontological intuitions in order to show that retributive intuitions cannot be used to justify retributive punishment in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for blame. The fundamental moral question thus becomes what we ought to do with these retributive intuitions, given that they do not justify retribution. I draw a parallel from recent work on implicit biases to make a case for taking moral responsibility for retributive intuitions. In the same way that we can exert some form of control over our unwanted implicit biases, we can and should do so for unjustified retributive intuitions in cases of robot harm.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1315–1328
JournalScience and Engineering Ethics
Volume26
Early online date16 Oct 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2020

Keywords

  • Debunking arguments
  • Human–robot interactions
  • Moral intuitions
  • Moral responsibility
  • Retribution
  • Retribution gaps

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