Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Pierre Von Mouche; Takashi Sato

doi:10.1142/S0219198919400103

Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Pierre Von Mouche^*, Takashi Sato

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p (y) = y-α. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten-Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.

Original language	English
Article number	1940010
Journal	International game theory review
Volume	21
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198919400103
Publication status	Published - 7 May 2019

Keywords

Cournot oligopoly
decreasing price flexibility
discontinuous payoff functions
equilibrium uniqueness
pseudo-concavity
Selten-Szidarovszky technique

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10.1142/S0219198919400103

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abstract = "We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p (y) = y-α. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten-Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.",

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AB - We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p (y) = y-α. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten-Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.

KW - Cournot oligopoly

KW - decreasing price flexibility

KW - discontinuous payoff functions

KW - equilibrium uniqueness

KW - pseudo-concavity

KW - Selten-Szidarovszky technique

U2 - 10.1142/S0219198919400103

DO - 10.1142/S0219198919400103

M3 - Article

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JF - International game theory review

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ER -

Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Abstract

Keywords

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