Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility

Pierre Von Mouche*, Takashi Sato

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider the equilibrium uniqueness problem for a large class of Cournot oligopolies with convex cost functions and a proper price function p with decreasing price flexibility. This class allows for (at 0) discontinuous industry revenue and in particular for p (y) = y-α. The paper illustrates in an exemplary way the Selten-Szidarovszky technique based on virtual backward reply functions. An algorithm for the calculation of the unique equilibrium is provided.

Original languageEnglish
JournalInternational game theory review
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 7 May 2019

Keywords

  • Cournot oligopoly
  • decreasing price flexibility
  • discontinuous payoff functions
  • equilibrium uniqueness
  • pseudo-concavity
  • Selten-Szidarovszky technique

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this