Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence

J. de Haan, J.G. Klomp

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

102 Citations (Scopus)


Until recently, most research on political budget cycles was based on the (often implicit) presumption that these cycles do not differ across countries. However, more recent studies focus on heterogeneity. This paper surveys studies examining the factors conditioning the occurrence and strength of manipulation of fiscal policy for electoral purposes, at the aggregate level or at the level of a particular type of government expenditure. Conditioning factors discussed include: the level of development, institutional quality, age and level of democracy, electoral rules and form of government, transparency of the political process, the presence of checks and balances, and fiscal rules.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)387-410
JournalPublic Choice
Issue number3-4
Publication statusPublished - 2013


  • business cycles
  • partisan cycles
  • fiscal rules
  • developing-countries
  • municipal level
  • policy choices
  • oecd countries
  • united-states
  • economy
  • election


Dive into the research topics of 'Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this