Common pool resources with support

Erik Ansink*, Hans Peter Weikard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers. Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives. We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions. Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.

Original languageEnglish
Article numbere12249
JournalNatural Resource Modeling
Volume33
Issue number1
Early online date19 Nov 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2020

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Keywords

  • cartel games
  • coalition formation
  • common pool resources
  • support

Cite this

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title = "Common pool resources with support",
abstract = "We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers. Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives. We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions. Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.",
keywords = "cartel games, coalition formation, common pool resources, support",
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Common pool resources with support. / Ansink, Erik; Weikard, Hans Peter.

In: Natural Resource Modeling, Vol. 33, No. 1, e12249, 02.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AB - We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers. Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives. We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions. Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.

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