Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements

E.J.H. Ansink, A.J.W. Ruijs

Research output: Book/ReportReportAcademic


We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean riverflow and an increase in the variance of riverflow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationMilano
PublisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Number of pages34
Publication statusPublished - 2007

Publication series

NameNote di lavoro della Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei = Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei working paper series
PublisherFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei


  • water allocation
  • water management
  • water use
  • contracts
  • water supply
  • rivers
  • river water
  • agreements


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