Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone

Maarten Voors; Ty Turley; Erwin Bulte; Andreas Kontoleon; John A. List

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2866

Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone

Maarten Voors^*, Ty Turley, Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A. List

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We use a field experiment in Sierra Leone to examine how the identity of the manager influences rent seeking and performance in participatory development projects. Specifically,we vary the composition of a committee responsible for implementing a development project-local elites or randomly selected villagers. The design is unique in that it permits us to explore the effectiveness of two alternative local governance modalities and the extent of elite capture in community projects. We find little evidence that local elites capture project resources. We do observe they are better managers of development projects. Improved performance covaries with a proxy for power of the local chief.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5855-5876
Number of pages	22
Journal	Management Science
Volume	64
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2866
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2018

Keywords

Africa
Chieftaincy
Development aid
Local governance

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1287/mnsc.2017.2866

https://edepot.wur.nl/474453Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

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abstract = "We use a field experiment in Sierra Leone to examine how the identity of the manager influences rent seeking and performance in participatory development projects. Specifically,we vary the composition of a committee responsible for implementing a development project-local elites or randomly selected villagers. The design is unique in that it permits us to explore the effectiveness of two alternative local governance modalities and the extent of elite capture in community projects. We find little evidence that local elites capture project resources. We do observe they are better managers of development projects. Improved performance covaries with a proxy for power of the local chief.",

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AU - Voors, Maarten

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AU - Bulte, Erwin

AU - Kontoleon, Andreas

AU - List, John A.

PY - 2018/12/1

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N2 - We use a field experiment in Sierra Leone to examine how the identity of the manager influences rent seeking and performance in participatory development projects. Specifically,we vary the composition of a committee responsible for implementing a development project-local elites or randomly selected villagers. The design is unique in that it permits us to explore the effectiveness of two alternative local governance modalities and the extent of elite capture in community projects. We find little evidence that local elites capture project resources. We do observe they are better managers of development projects. Improved performance covaries with a proxy for power of the local chief.

AB - We use a field experiment in Sierra Leone to examine how the identity of the manager influences rent seeking and performance in participatory development projects. Specifically,we vary the composition of a committee responsible for implementing a development project-local elites or randomly selected villagers. The design is unique in that it permits us to explore the effectiveness of two alternative local governance modalities and the extent of elite capture in community projects. We find little evidence that local elites capture project resources. We do observe they are better managers of development projects. Improved performance covaries with a proxy for power of the local chief.

KW - Africa

KW - Chieftaincy

KW - Development aid

KW - Local governance

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DO - 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2866

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JO - Management Science

JF - Management Science

IS - 12

ER -

Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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