Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone

Maarten Voors, Ty Turley, Erwin Bulte, Andreas Kontoleon, John A. List

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We use a field experiment in Sierra Leone to examine how the identity of the manager influences rent seeking and performance in participatory development projects. Specifically,we vary the composition of a committee responsible for implementing a development project-local elites or randomly selected villagers. The design is unique in that it permits us to explore the effectiveness of two alternative local governance modalities and the extent of elite capture in community projects. We find little evidence that local elites capture project resources. We do observe they are better managers of development projects. Improved performance covaries with a proxy for power of the local chief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5855-5876
Number of pages22
JournalManagement Science
Volume64
Issue number12
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2018

Fingerprint

Elite capture
Field experiment
Management performance
Sierra Leone
Development projects
Managers
Local governance
Participatory development
Resources
Rent-seeking
Elites

Keywords

  • Africa
  • Chieftaincy
  • Development aid
  • Local governance

Cite this

Voors, Maarten ; Turley, Ty ; Bulte, Erwin ; Kontoleon, Andreas ; List, John A. / Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone. In: Management Science. 2018 ; Vol. 64, No. 12. pp. 5855-5876.
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Chief for a day: Elite capture and management performance in a field experiment in Sierra Leone. / Voors, Maarten; Turley, Ty; Bulte, Erwin; Kontoleon, Andreas; List, John A.

In: Management Science, Vol. 64, No. 12, 01.12.2018, p. 5855-5876.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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