Central bank independence and inflation revisited

J.G. Klomp; J. de Haan

doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9672-z

Central bank independence and inflation revisited

J.G. Klomp, J. de Haan

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

45 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We re-examine the relationship between central bank independence (CBI), proxied by the central bank governor's turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws in place, and inflation using a random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck estimator for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005. We conclude that there exists no general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence and inflation. Central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the countries in our sample.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	445-457
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	144
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9672-z
Publication status	Published - 2010

Keywords

cross-country analysis
economic-growth

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1007/s11127-010-9672-z

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AB - We re-examine the relationship between central bank independence (CBI), proxied by the central bank governor's turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws in place, and inflation using a random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck estimator for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005. We conclude that there exists no general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence and inflation. Central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the countries in our sample.

KW - cross-country analysis

KW - economic-growth

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-010-9672-z

DO - 10.1007/s11127-010-9672-z

M3 - Article

SN - 0048-5829

VL - 144

SP - 445

EP - 457

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

ER -

Central bank independence and inflation revisited

Abstract

Keywords

UN SDGs

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