Central bank independence and inflation revisited

J.G. Klomp, J. de Haan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We re-examine the relationship between central bank independence (CBI), proxied by the central bank governor's turnover rate and an indicator based on central bank laws in place, and inflation using a random coefficient model with the Hildreth-Houck estimator for more than 100 countries in the period 1980 to 2005. We conclude that there exists no general significant negative relation between our indicators of central bank independence and inflation. Central bank independence has a significant effect only in a minority of the countries in our sample.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)445-457
JournalPublic Choice
Volume144
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

Keywords

  • cross-country analysis
  • economic-growth

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