Avian influenza trasnmission risks: analysis of biosecuritiy measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming

A. Ssematimba, T.H.J. Hagenaars, J.J. de Wit, F. Ruiterkamp, T.H.F. Fabri, J.A. Stegeman, M.C.M. de Jong

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In the 2003 epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry, between-farm virus transmission continued for considerable time despite control measures. Gaining more insight into the mechanisms of this spread is necessary for the possible development of better control strategies. We carried out an in-depth interview study aiming to systematically explore all the poultry production activities to identify the activities that could potentially be related to virus introduction and transmission. One of the between-farm contact risks that were identified is the movement of birds between farms during thinning with violations of on-farm biosecurity protocols. In addition, several other risky management practices, risky visitor behaviours and biosecurity breaches were identified. They include human and fomite contacts that occurred without observing biosecurity protocols, poor waste management practices, presence of other animal species on poultry farms, and poor biosecurity against risks from farm neighbourhood activities. Among the detailed practices identified, taking cell phones and jewellery into poultry houses, not observing shower-in protocols and the exchange of unclean farm equipment were common. Also, sometimes certain protocols or biosecurity facilities were lacking. We also asked the interviewed farmers about their perception of transmission risks and found that they had divergent opinions about the visitor- and neighbourhood-associated risks. We performed a qualitative assessment of contact risks (as transmission pathways) based on contact type, corresponding biosecurity practices, and contact frequency. This assessment suggests that the most risky contact types are bird movements during thinning and restocking, most human movements accessing poultry houses and proximity to other poultry farms. The overall risk posed by persons and equipment accessing storage rooms and the premises-only contacts was considered to be medium. Most of the exposure risks are considered to be similar for layer and broiler farms. Our results, including those on farmer opinions, are relevant for the communication with farmers and poultry-related businesses about practices and risks. We conclude by providing recommendations for improvement of control strategies.
LanguageEnglish
Pages106-115
JournalPreventive Veterinary Medicine
Volume109
Issue number1-2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Influenza in Birds
risk analysis
avian influenza
Poultry
Agriculture
biosecurity
poultry
farming systems
farms
poultry housing
storage equipment
Birds
fomites
Fomites
Jewelry
farmers
farmers' attitudes
Viruses
Waste Management
agricultural machinery and equipment

Keywords

  • potential pathways
  • virus h7n7
  • a viruses
  • netherlands
  • epidemic
  • chickens
  • georgia
  • canada
  • japan

Cite this

Ssematimba, A. ; Hagenaars, T.H.J. ; de Wit, J.J. ; Ruiterkamp, F. ; Fabri, T.H.F. ; Stegeman, J.A. ; de Jong, M.C.M. / Avian influenza trasnmission risks: analysis of biosecuritiy measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming. In: Preventive Veterinary Medicine. 2013 ; Vol. 109, No. 1-2. pp. 106-115.
@article{3d62f2def9eb4519b1e68c4086825c9f,
title = "Avian influenza trasnmission risks: analysis of biosecuritiy measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming",
abstract = "In the 2003 epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry, between-farm virus transmission continued for considerable time despite control measures. Gaining more insight into the mechanisms of this spread is necessary for the possible development of better control strategies. We carried out an in-depth interview study aiming to systematically explore all the poultry production activities to identify the activities that could potentially be related to virus introduction and transmission. One of the between-farm contact risks that were identified is the movement of birds between farms during thinning with violations of on-farm biosecurity protocols. In addition, several other risky management practices, risky visitor behaviours and biosecurity breaches were identified. They include human and fomite contacts that occurred without observing biosecurity protocols, poor waste management practices, presence of other animal species on poultry farms, and poor biosecurity against risks from farm neighbourhood activities. Among the detailed practices identified, taking cell phones and jewellery into poultry houses, not observing shower-in protocols and the exchange of unclean farm equipment were common. Also, sometimes certain protocols or biosecurity facilities were lacking. We also asked the interviewed farmers about their perception of transmission risks and found that they had divergent opinions about the visitor- and neighbourhood-associated risks. We performed a qualitative assessment of contact risks (as transmission pathways) based on contact type, corresponding biosecurity practices, and contact frequency. This assessment suggests that the most risky contact types are bird movements during thinning and restocking, most human movements accessing poultry houses and proximity to other poultry farms. The overall risk posed by persons and equipment accessing storage rooms and the premises-only contacts was considered to be medium. Most of the exposure risks are considered to be similar for layer and broiler farms. Our results, including those on farmer opinions, are relevant for the communication with farmers and poultry-related businesses about practices and risks. We conclude by providing recommendations for improvement of control strategies.",
keywords = "potential pathways, virus h7n7, a viruses, netherlands, epidemic, chickens, georgia, canada, japan",
author = "A. Ssematimba and T.H.J. Hagenaars and {de Wit}, J.J. and F. Ruiterkamp and T.H.F. Fabri and J.A. Stegeman and {de Jong}, M.C.M.",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.09.001",
language = "English",
volume = "109",
pages = "106--115",
journal = "Preventive Veterinary Medicine",
issn = "0167-5877",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1-2",

}

Avian influenza trasnmission risks: analysis of biosecuritiy measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming. / Ssematimba, A.; Hagenaars, T.H.J.; de Wit, J.J.; Ruiterkamp, F.; Fabri, T.H.F.; Stegeman, J.A.; de Jong, M.C.M.

In: Preventive Veterinary Medicine, Vol. 109, No. 1-2, 2013, p. 106-115.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Avian influenza trasnmission risks: analysis of biosecuritiy measures and contact structure in Dutch poultry farming

AU - Ssematimba, A.

AU - Hagenaars, T.H.J.

AU - de Wit, J.J.

AU - Ruiterkamp, F.

AU - Fabri, T.H.F.

AU - Stegeman, J.A.

AU - de Jong, M.C.M.

PY - 2013

Y1 - 2013

N2 - In the 2003 epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry, between-farm virus transmission continued for considerable time despite control measures. Gaining more insight into the mechanisms of this spread is necessary for the possible development of better control strategies. We carried out an in-depth interview study aiming to systematically explore all the poultry production activities to identify the activities that could potentially be related to virus introduction and transmission. One of the between-farm contact risks that were identified is the movement of birds between farms during thinning with violations of on-farm biosecurity protocols. In addition, several other risky management practices, risky visitor behaviours and biosecurity breaches were identified. They include human and fomite contacts that occurred without observing biosecurity protocols, poor waste management practices, presence of other animal species on poultry farms, and poor biosecurity against risks from farm neighbourhood activities. Among the detailed practices identified, taking cell phones and jewellery into poultry houses, not observing shower-in protocols and the exchange of unclean farm equipment were common. Also, sometimes certain protocols or biosecurity facilities were lacking. We also asked the interviewed farmers about their perception of transmission risks and found that they had divergent opinions about the visitor- and neighbourhood-associated risks. We performed a qualitative assessment of contact risks (as transmission pathways) based on contact type, corresponding biosecurity practices, and contact frequency. This assessment suggests that the most risky contact types are bird movements during thinning and restocking, most human movements accessing poultry houses and proximity to other poultry farms. The overall risk posed by persons and equipment accessing storage rooms and the premises-only contacts was considered to be medium. Most of the exposure risks are considered to be similar for layer and broiler farms. Our results, including those on farmer opinions, are relevant for the communication with farmers and poultry-related businesses about practices and risks. We conclude by providing recommendations for improvement of control strategies.

AB - In the 2003 epidemic of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Dutch poultry, between-farm virus transmission continued for considerable time despite control measures. Gaining more insight into the mechanisms of this spread is necessary for the possible development of better control strategies. We carried out an in-depth interview study aiming to systematically explore all the poultry production activities to identify the activities that could potentially be related to virus introduction and transmission. One of the between-farm contact risks that were identified is the movement of birds between farms during thinning with violations of on-farm biosecurity protocols. In addition, several other risky management practices, risky visitor behaviours and biosecurity breaches were identified. They include human and fomite contacts that occurred without observing biosecurity protocols, poor waste management practices, presence of other animal species on poultry farms, and poor biosecurity against risks from farm neighbourhood activities. Among the detailed practices identified, taking cell phones and jewellery into poultry houses, not observing shower-in protocols and the exchange of unclean farm equipment were common. Also, sometimes certain protocols or biosecurity facilities were lacking. We also asked the interviewed farmers about their perception of transmission risks and found that they had divergent opinions about the visitor- and neighbourhood-associated risks. We performed a qualitative assessment of contact risks (as transmission pathways) based on contact type, corresponding biosecurity practices, and contact frequency. This assessment suggests that the most risky contact types are bird movements during thinning and restocking, most human movements accessing poultry houses and proximity to other poultry farms. The overall risk posed by persons and equipment accessing storage rooms and the premises-only contacts was considered to be medium. Most of the exposure risks are considered to be similar for layer and broiler farms. Our results, including those on farmer opinions, are relevant for the communication with farmers and poultry-related businesses about practices and risks. We conclude by providing recommendations for improvement of control strategies.

KW - potential pathways

KW - virus h7n7

KW - a viruses

KW - netherlands

KW - epidemic

KW - chickens

KW - georgia

KW - canada

KW - japan

U2 - 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.09.001

DO - 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.09.001

M3 - Article

VL - 109

SP - 106

EP - 115

JO - Preventive Veterinary Medicine

T2 - Preventive Veterinary Medicine

JF - Preventive Veterinary Medicine

SN - 0167-5877

IS - 1-2

ER -