Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection

S. Gangopadhyay, B.W. Lensink

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)


This paper shows that an asymmetric group debt contract, where one borrower co-signs for another, but not vice versa, leads to heterogeneous matching. The analysis suggests that micro finance organizations can achieve the first best by offering asymmetric group contracts. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-187
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2014


  • joint liability


Dive into the research topics of 'Asymmetric group loans, non-assortative matching and adverse selection'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this