An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements

M. Finus, M.E. Sáiz Pérez, E.M.T. Hendrix

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)117-137
JournalEnvironment and Development Economics
Volume14
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Fingerprint

coalition
climate change
voting
cost
costs
test
International environmental agreements
Empirical test
world
Abatement
Voting
Climate change
Unanimity
Empirical model
Cost estimates

Keywords

  • climate agreements
  • externalities
  • cooperation
  • membership
  • stability
  • success
  • equity
  • costs

Cite this

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An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements. / Finus, M.; Sáiz Pérez, M.E.; Hendrix, E.M.T.

In: Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 14, 2009, p. 117-137.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

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AU - Finus, M.

AU - Sáiz Pérez, M.E.

AU - Hendrix, E.M.T.

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AB - We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.

KW - climate agreements

KW - externalities

KW - cooperation

KW - membership

KW - stability

KW - success

KW - equity

KW - costs

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JO - Environment and Development Economics

JF - Environment and Development Economics

SN - 1355-770X

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