32. The ethics and mindedness of insects

Several insect species, including flies, have been proposed as feed for pigs and poultry. The larvae of these flies can convert organic left-over streams into high quality animal protein, while requiring a low-value input: the substrate for mass-rearing these insects could include pig and poultry manure, resulting in a low environmental impact due to its circular use of resources. This proposed innovation has allure, because it seems to reconcile conflicting economic and environmental interests. However, this proposal raises several questions, for example, about insect sentience. Sentience is often defined as feeling, and being equated with phenomenal consciousness, which has been seriously criticized within philosophy of mind. It is disputed whether phenomenal consciousness is necessary for explaining and predicting behaviour, and thus deemed irrelevant for understanding a subject’s mental life altogether, subsequently undermining its moral significance. Peter Carruthers provides an alternative approach to animal suffering and moral status, without invoking phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, we explore his alternative approach to animal mentality and moral status: ‘suffering without subjectivity’. Finally, we discuss the possible implications for ethics and a potential insect industry.